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In the aftermath of war and large-scale violence, how can nations function as societies?
How can people learn to live together again? Or, have the foundations of trust, civility,
and predictability upon which fully functioning societies depend been irrevocably dam-
aged? If we want to understand why reconciliation does or does not take root, we must
begin by understanding the perspectives and interests of individuals. In this article, I
develop such a model of individual attitudes towards reconciliation. In particular, I
analyse the determinants of individual beliefs about reconciliation, with a particular
emphasis on the impact of violence in Colombia. I combine survey data from the Latin
American Public Opinion Project survey on individual attitudes regarding reconcilia-
tion with data on political violence to measure the extent to which individuals live in
environments characterised by violence and how this shapes their opinions about
reconciliation.
Resumen
A raı́z de la guerra y la violencia a gran escala, ¿cómo pueden las naciones funcionar como
sociedades? ¿Cómo pueden las personas aprender a vivir juntas de nuevo? ¿O se han
dañado irrevocablemente los fundamentos de confianza, cortesı́a y previsibilidad de los
que dependen las sociedades en pleno funcionamiento? Si queremos entender por qué la
reconciliación se arraiga o no, debemos comenzar por comprender las perspectivas e
intereses de los individuos. En este art́ıculo, desarrollo un modelo de actitudes indivi-
duales hacia la reconciliación. En particular, analizo los determinantes de las creencias
individuales sobre la reconciliación, con un énfasis particular en el impacto de la violencia
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en Colombia. Combino datos de encuestas de la encuesta del Proyecto de Opinión
Pública de América Latina (LAPOP) sobre actitudes individuales con respecto a la
reconciliación con datos sobre violencia poĺıtica para medir la medida en que las per-
sonas viven en entornos caracterizados por la violencia y cómo esto da forma a sus
opiniones sobre la reconciliación.
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Introduction
Many observers and scholars have commented on the bloodiness and brutality of civil
wars (see Kalyvas, 2006 for an excellent review). The violence where neighbour fights
neighbour, brother battles brother, and daughters fight fathers is thought to be excep-
tionally severe because it is intimate and because the stakes could not be higher. The
Rwanda genocide, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia–Herzegovina, and the staggering
civilian death tolls in Syria, the Congo, and Colombia all attest to the exceptional
destruction of civil wars. My concern in this article is what happens next. In the after-
math of such violence, how can nations function again as societies? How can people
learn to live together again? Or, have the foundations of trust and civility upon which
fully functioning societies depend been irrevocably damaged? There has been a spate of
research regarding reconciliation after conflict, and if there is one simple fact that nearly
all scholars agree on, it is that reconciliation is a profoundly human and social encounter
(Clark, 2014; Gibson, 2004a, 2004b; Hamber, 2007; Hewstone et al., 2006; Meernik and
Guerrero, 2014; Meernik et al., 2016; Mendeloff, 2004, 2009; Olsen et al., 2010; Staub,
2006, 2013). If we want to understand why reconciliation does or does not take root, we
must begin by understanding the perspectives and interests of individuals. In this article,
I develop such a model of individual attitudes towards reconciliation. In particular, I
analyse the determinants of individual beliefs about reconciliation emphasising the
impact of personally experienced as well as community-level violence. As well, I find
that individual attitudes regarding the most salient issues raised by the war, especially
their views on coca and cocaine, play a critical role in explaining people’s opinions about
reconciliation.
After a long and destructive war, some individuals may wish to forget the past, focus
on the future, and prefer to consign questions of blame and consequences to history
books. Other people may simply wish for retribution. Their pain and suffering may
demand that the perpetrators of violence be held accountable for their crimes and
punished to the full extent of the law. And then there are other persons who become more
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resilient in the face of bloodshed and tragedy and discover inner strength that propels
them towards social reconstruction. Research regarding the impact of violence on
reconciliation has been growing. While some research has shown that many individuals
develop positive attitudes and engage in socially constructive activities as a result of
their personal exposure to violence (e.g. Bauer et al., 2016; Elcheroth and Spini, 2009;
Hall et al., 2018), others have found that victims of violence are often less likely to
forgive the perpetrators (Bakke et al., 2009). Yet others find a lack of evidence of any
specific impact (Nussio et al., 2015; Rettburg and Ugarriza, 2016). I contend that per-
sonal experience with violence is likely to have diverse impacts depending on a host of
social and psychological factors, which are beyond the range of this study to assess, but
are likely not to produce a consistent effect on individual attitudes regarding reconci-
liation. Conversely, I argue that individuals who reside in former conflict zones in
general will tend to develop more positive attitudes regarding reconciliation. I suggest
that the contextual effects of violence will tend to increase the resilience of many
individuals and communities, and hence lead to a greater belief in the prospects for
reconciliation.
I also highlight the impact of attitudes regarding the political issues that motivated the
conflict violence. At the conclusion of such conflicts, one of the most critical questions
for a society will be how its problems, as identified and highlighted by rebels and
opposition forces, are to be addressed, especially when there is a negotiated peace
agreement and not outright victory. Will society and politicians take seriously the issues
raised by conflict actors, which in the case of Colombia generally focused on poverty in
neglected regions of the country, the unequal distribution of wealth, and the lack of
support and services for those residing in such areas? We would expect that those
individuals who believe that government should take action to address the problems
identified by the rebels will be more likely to support reconciliation. When individuals’
political preferences align with the objectives of those fighting against the government,
I suggest they are more predisposed to support reconciliation.
To investigate the determinants of belief in reconciliation, I focus on violence and
politics in Colombia. I do so for several reasons. First, Colombia has been involved in
internal conflicts since the early 1960s and thus makes the question of reconciliation
especially vital and deserving of scholarly attention. The leftist revolts of the early 1960s
ushered in two groups that have been at the centre of the violence in Colombia – the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN). Just recently, the Colombian government reached a peace agreement with the
FARC guerillas and has sought to integrate them into society. Thus, after many years
peace is at hand, but the real battle for reconciliation among the people of Colombia now
begins. Second, Colombia is a data-rich environment. The Colombian government has
kept extensive records for many years on the various types of political and war violence
that have affected that nation. And while there are always concerns regarding the
accuracy of such data and problems with under-reporting, we have among the most
extensive data available on subnational violence across the 1100þ municipalities that
comprise Colombia. Together, the critical importance of reconciliation in Colombia as
well as extensive localised data make Colombia an ideal case to better understand the
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determinants of reconciliation among individuals. Thus, I combine survey data from the
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to measure attitudes regarding
reconciliation and personal experience with violence, with data on political violence
from the Colombian government to measure the extent to which individuals live in
environments characterised by violence. While my principal goal is to understand the
role of violence regarding reconciliation, I also utilise a variety of other key factors
regarding trust, government policy, and demographic indicators to better understand
Colombian attitudes towards reconciliation.
The article is organised as follows. I begin by reviewing research on reconciliation
after war and periods of human rights repression. Next, I develop my model of recon-
ciliation and derive several hypotheses. I then discuss the other key parameters and
control variables in the model, the methods used, and I test the model of attitudes
regarding reconciliation using both a standard probit model and a multilevel probit
model to account for the environments in which individuals develop these attitudes. I
find while individuals who live in areas characterised by political violence are more
likely to believe in the prospects for reconciliation, those who have personally experi-
enced violence are neither more nor less likely to hold such attitudes. I also find that
individuals’ political preferences regarding the issues over which the conflict was fought
play a powerful role in shaping attitudes towards reconciliation. Finally, I comment in
the conclusion on how such models can be refined and how the results can inform future
research.
The Many Faces of Reconciliation
Reconciliation after war or periods of severe human rights repression has proven to be
one of the most vexing concepts to define, measure, and assess change at all levels – the
individual, group, and nation (Clark, 2009, 2011; Rettberg and Ugarriza, 2016; Tellez,
2019). While rather simplistic, a distinction between thin and thick depictions of
reconciliation is useful for establishing key benchmarks and distinct ends of a spectrum
of beliefs and actions. A “thin” definition of reconciliation, in essence, expects little out
of people and is mostly content with a basic modicum of tolerance among individuals
and peoples that would hinder a return to hostility and violence. Staub (2006: 868) writes
that reconciliation, “ . . . may be defined as mutual acceptance by groups of each other.”
In his path breaking research on reconciliation in South Africa, Gibson (2004a: 13)
contends that, “When people talk about reconciliation, they often mean nothing more
than people of different races getting along better with each other – that is, a diminution
of racial animosities.” Indeed, in the context of civil wars and other forms of violence in
which hundreds if not thousands are killed, simple acceptance of the “other” is some-
thing of a victory. Deeper reconciliation may be necessary for a healthy and secure
society, but in the aftermath of violence, the mere avoidance of war can mark a sig-
nificant milestone.
There are adherents to the perspective that truly meaningful reconciliation is deep,
difficult and drawn-out (Clark, 2014). Such “thick” definitions and expectations for
reconciliation would demand changes in attitudes and behaviour that reflect truly
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meaningful transformation and progress towards acceptance and interaction with one’s
former adversaries (Strupinskien _e, 2017). On the one hand, a thin depiction of recon-
ciliation might be limited to adherence to a particular belief in tolerance, and as such may
constitute “cheap talk.” A thick version of reconciliation, however, might demand the
individual to not just “talk the talk, but walk the walk” and change behaviours, such as
being willing to work with, live next to, and accept marriages with members of the
“other.” Thick definitions of reconciliation emphasise its dynamic nature (i.e. reconci-
liation should be conceptualised as a process or journey rather than a single state of
mind); its complexity (it encompasses personal beliefs, social behaviours, political
actions), as well as its elusive qualities (the intermixture of personal feelings and social
mores). Indeed, as Strupinskien _e (2017) points out, there have been over sixty definitions
of reconciliation in the political science literature, to say nothing of research emanating
from anthropology, psychology, and sociology. The challenges involved in defining and
studying such a concept are substantial enough to be discouraging, but I would argue that
the research demonstrates that we can learn more about this concept despite its com-
plexity by remaining cognisant of problems of measurement and inference.
Not surprisingly, research has offered a number of diverse findings regarding what
particular personal, social, and political factors may affect the degree to which indi-
viduals develop reconciliatory attitudes. Hewstone et al. (2006: 107) find that in the
context of Northern Ireland, those individuals “who reported having more contact with
out-group members held a more positive attitude toward mixing with the out-group” (see
also Meernik et al., 2016). Some research has found that public education can help bridge
divides (Cole, 2007; Jones, 2012; Smith, 2005). Hewstone and Brown (1986) and
Hewstone et al. (2006) examined Protest and Catholic schools in Northern Ireland and
found that “contact predicts attitude toward mixing with the out-group, and is in turn
predicted by education” (Hewstone et al., 2006: 106). Gordon Allport’s “contact
hypothesis” (1954) also holds that contact between groups can help to reduce intergroup
prejudices and promote tolerance. Works by Gibson (2004b) and Staub (2006, 2013)
demonstrate that if reconciliation is promoted in an integrated group environment in
which citizens from all sides of a conflict are represented, there is a greater chance that
attitudes and behaviours may change. Other research (Kostic, 2008, Staub, 2013, Gibson,
2004a, 2004b) indicates that when such environments promote mutual acknowl-
edgement of suffering, a common view of the relevant events of the past and a vision for
the future, reconciliation is more likely. However, such demands are almost as onerous
as reconciliation itself and suggest that substantial amounts of effort and time are needed
to prepare the way to bring people together.
A number of scholars, however, are not so optimistic about the prospects for
reconciliation (Cole, 2007) in divided societies. Clark (2014) finds that in the Balkans,
reconciliation is but a distant prospect, and that (2009: 372), “It is therefore imperative
that the problems of denial and multiple truths, which both attest to the absence of,
and fundamentally mitigate against reconciliation, are addressed.” Indeed, since
reconciliation became a buzzword in studies of transitional justice (especially after the
formation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission) and was held
out as a rationale for the creation of the international criminal tribunals, there have been a
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number of sceptics. Many scholars are doubtful that reconciliation can be deliberately
engineered by politicians (Mendeloff 2004, 2009; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003). In
fact, some research has found that schools in ethnically divided nations may promote a
one-sided and divisive view of history and society that holds one’s own group out as the
victor or the victim and the “other” as the aggressive and uncompromising force bent on
domination (Cole, 2007). Such post-conflict political strategies are implicitly or even
explicitly designed to prevent groups from coming together to reconcile.
I am most concerned, however, with the impact of violence on reconciliation. The
violence of war is, in fact, the very reason why reconciliation becomes necessary.
Therefore, if we are to understand its determinants, we must take cognisance of the
role violence played, and may continue to play, in affecting people’s beliefs about
their former/current adversaries. Here the research offers contradictory expectations.
On the one hand, even the casual observer of war and violence would understand that
individuals who have suffered harm and human rights repression might tend to har-
bour negative emotions regarding the adversary generally and the perpetrator more
specifically. The desire for vengeance arising from personal human rights violations is
natural. Those who have been victims might also develop psychological difficulties,
such as post-traumatic stress disorder that interfere with the ability to reconcile
(Staub, 2006). As Meernik and Guerrero (2014: 395) write, “Mistrust, a loss of a
sense of control of their lives, a negative self-identity, and a lack of positive con-
nections with other groups create psychological barriers for reconciliation amongst
formerly warring parties.”
Therefore, we might expect that greater personal exposure to violence may lead some
individuals to become more reluctant to reconcile, in whatever form. The lack of trust,
feelings of personal insecurity and trauma, and desire for retribution may cause indi-
viduals to reject outright efforts made to foster reconciliation (Hall et al., 2018; Posner,
2004; Widner, 2004). Even individuals who may be willing to consider the possibility of
reconciliation may require a “price” for that effort that is expensive. They may demand a
degree of truth (e.g. attribution of responsibility no matter how high in the chain of
command it extends) and a severity of punishment (e.g. life imprisonment) that conflict
actors are unwilling to accept. Using a mixed individual and contextual model to assess
the impact of violence on attitudes towards reconciliation and forgiveness in the Cau-
casus region of Russia, Bakke et al. (2009: 1018) find that, “Respondents who feel that
their lives have been significantly changed by violence in the region are also less likely
to forgive than those who have not experienced such violence-induced life changes.”
One finds evidence of such antagonism towards former adversaries in many post-
conflict environments. For example, even when the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia handed down a 46-year prison sentence to Radislav Krstic, a
Bosnian Serb general who played a prominent role in the Srebrenica genocide, there was
substantial outrage that he was not given a life sentence at trial. Individuals with the
Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa Enclaves expressed their anger that he
was given “just” a 46-year sentence. One woman stated that, “Today, among the mothers
with wounded souls, I do not see even a bit of satisfaction at the length of his sentence.”1
Indeed, the Colombian people narrowly rejected the peace treaty with the FARC in a
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public referendum for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the perceived
leniency accorded former FARC members for their crimes as well as their guaranteed
political representation in the legislature. For many Colombians, especially those behind
the “No” campaign, this was too much forgiveness, in effect, to offer. Ultimately in this
case and in many others, conflict victims can be more interested in justice than peace.
On the other hand, there is research that suggests that some individuals become more
engaged in and make positive contributions to their communities in the aftermath of
violence. Bauer et al. (2016) provide an extensive overview of research on people’s
reactions to violence and find that often such individuals grow more cooperative, par-
ticipate in more social activities, assume leadership positions, and give altruistically.
Further, the research suggests that these positive effects are not conditional upon gender,
age, and victim/perpetrator status. They write:
The evidence suggests that war affects behavior in a range of situations, real and experi-
mental. People exposed to more war-related violence tend to increase their social partici-
pation, by joining more local social and civic groups or taking on more leadership roles in
their communities. They also take actions intended to benefit others in experimental labora-
tory games, such as altruistic giving. (Bauer et al., 2016: 3)
Additionally, Bakke et al. (2009) found that while individuals in the Caucasus region
of Russia were less likely to forgive their victimisers, they also found that greater
proximity to violence led to a greater willingness to forgive. As well, Hall et al.
(2018: 350) find, “that while exposure to heinous war crimes increases support for
retributive justice (stemming from the wartime logic of deterrence), interdependence
with perpetrators increases victims’ support for restorative justice.” Elcheroth and Spini
(2009: 190) find that in some communities that experience severe violence, there is often
greater support for human rights and humanitarian norms (Spini et al., 2008), while
Elcheroth (2006) shows that traumatised individuals are often less likely to desire retri-
bution. The words of a witness who appeared before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia regarding his testimony epitomise this perspective:
. . . perhaps I ought to put it as simply as possible, which means that when you have been
through a number of storms it is clearly easier to bear the next storm. Because you get a little
harder, you have more experience, you know that there is sunshine after the rain, and after
the sunshine, there is the rain again, so that, in that sense, you must accept it, with a lot of
optimism, particularly from that side in order to preserve the mental health of both yourself
and your family. (Meernik and King, 2019)
Thus, the literature is also supportive of the opposite expectation – that individuals
who have been personally affected by the violence will be more supportive of prosocial
attitudes and efforts that might include positive views regarding reconciliation.
As the research review has shown, there is not a solid consensus among scholars
regarding the impact of violence on individual attitudes towards reconciliation after
violence. The most thorough analysis to date, however, by Bakke et al. (2009),
demonstrates that both the individual and the contextual level of analysis should be
Meernik 329
incorporated into our research designs to best model the effects of the internal and
external worlds in which people live. And as Rettburg and Ugarriza (2016: 533) write:
Notably, the findings fail to suggest any significant difference between victims and non-
victims in terms of their opinions and preferences, a finding that we also arrived at in an
earlier work (Nussio et al., 2015) and which suggests that either the violent experience of
armed conflict impacts people’s opinions on transitional justice mechanisms less than
previously expected, or permeates the general population in a spill-over effect to such an
extent that it levels people’s preferences.
The research tends to suggest that because of the diversity of types of violence people
experience, and the different ways they process and perceive such violence, we are
unlikely to find there is one consistent relationship between personal exposure to vio-
lence and attitudes towards reconciliation. On the other hand, there are studies that
suggest communities that have been exposed to violence are often (not always) more
apt to view reconciliation in a more favourable light.
Theoretical Expectations
Background
Before delving more deeply into the theoretical expectations driving this article, it is
important to understand a bit of Colombian history to put the questions of violence,
peace, and reconciliation into context. Colombia has experienced decades of violence of
all kinds. There was the political violence between liberals and conservatives, which
reached its peak during the period known simply as “La Violencia” in the late 1940s and
1950s (although it too was preceded by other outbreaks of political violence). Leftist
guerilla movements were organised in the early 1960s, although their violence peaked
more in the last 20–30 years. There were the drug wars and violence among the drug
cartels, the government, the paramilitaries, and eventually the guerillas beginning in the
late 1970s. In short, Colombia has suffered much violence over the last 70 years and was,
presumably, ready for a respite. After several failed attempts at peace, President Alvaro
Uribe (elected in 2002 and again in 2006) took a much more hard-line position against
the FARC guerillas, greatly increased spending on the Colombian military, counte-
nanced alliances with paramilitary groups fighting against leftist rebels, and secured
billions of dollars in aid from the United States. Uribe’s hard-line tactics helped push the
FARC to the negotiating table. Under President Uribe’s former defence secretary and
successor, President Juan Manuel Santos, the government pursued peace negotiations
with the FARC for several years in Havana, Cuba. The 2016 peace accord between the
Colombian government and the FARC rebels is among lengthiest and most codified
peace agreements ever engineered (Quinn and Joshi, 2019). However, shortly after the
parties reached an agreement, the peace treaty was defeated in a referendum on 2nd
October, by a narrow margin of Colombian voters. Subsequently, the Colombian gov-
ernment and the FARC rebels returned to the negotiating table to try to address some of
the areas of the agreement where there was opposition. That revised agreement was
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eventually ratified by the Colombian legislature. The difficult and expensive peace-
building effort began.
I contend that the impact of violence on people’s attitudes in this post-conflict era will
depend on whether we are assessing the personal experiences of individuals who have
been affected by violence, or the social context in which they experience violence.
Simply stated, I argue that the effects of personal experience with violence are likely to
differ substantially depending on a variety of factors, but most especially the psycho-
logical context through which the individual interprets and processes violence. Some
individuals are more likely to be resilient and channel the abuses they suffered in pro-
ductive directions as suggested by scholars like Bauer et al. (2016). Other individuals
may develop more of a desire for retribution to confront their personal experience with
violence. Therefore, I would not expect a consistent relationship between personal
experience with violence and attitudes regarding reconciliation, and especially so in a
place like Colombia where the violence involved multiple actors and various spells of
violence and warfare over a number of years. Given the lack of consistent findings on
this topic and in the absence of more in-depth psychological data that might allow us to
identify individuals who are more or less inclined to reconciliation because of their own
personality and history, I hypothesise that we are not likely to find a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between personal exposure to violence and reconciliation.
Conversely, I would argue that those living in a context of violence in their com-
munity would, in general, be more supportive of reconciliation. To be sure, some number
of those in communities across Colombia that have experienced bloodshed will have
first-hand knowledge of violence and will likely exhibit the same degree of diversity in
their opinions regarding reconciliation. More generally, however, I argue that
community-level or contextual violence will produce attitudes more supportive of
reconciliation among members of the community, in general. Such pro-reconciliation
beliefs might stem from several factors.
First, living in communities that have experienced violence may lead many indi-
viduals to be supportive of security and stability in general, as well as those social
developments, such as reconciliation among adversaries that presage peace and pros-
perity. Having suffered through violence in their municipalities, these community
members may be favourably inclined towards reconciliation as one method by which to
establish and fortify peace. The consequences of the long war with the FARC impeded
economic development and contributed to political and economic alienation in these
municipalities from the rest of the nation. Those communities that have been especially
harmed by the violence would, in theory, stand to gain economically because of the
peace and the hoped for reconciliation. Research has shown in the Colombian context
that those individuals who lived in the regions that saw the most conflict violence were
more likely to support the peace treaty referendum (Dávalos et al., 2018).
For example, there were numerous, local peace initiatives during the conflict in
Colombia that brought community members together in their common interest of ending
violence committed by all sides. In Antioquia, there were two especially notable peace
initiatives, the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó and the Tarso’s Constituent
Assembly (Uribe-López and Correa-Barrera, 2019). In both cases, community members
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banded together and grew their social capital as a response to violence, which is quite
similar to what scholars like Bauer et al. (2016) have argued about community resilience
in general. Resilient communities come together to work against violence and for peace.
It is reasonable to suppose that communities that engage in such productive responses
because of violence might also be more inclined to support efforts at reconciliation as
well.
Second, when the potential and reality of being affected by violence exist throughout
a municipality, there develops in such communities a sense of “shared risk.” This per-
ception of sharing the same fate can then contribute towards greater community support
for prosocial attitudes and norms such as reconciliation (see Spini et al., 2008). This
community-level resilience in which the bonds among community members grows
stronger as a result of their shared exposure to the effects of violence may also help to
produce other prosocial attitudes that contribute towards recognition of the importance
of reconciliation in the eventual and ultimately important healing and restoration of the
community.
Finally, for individuals living in communities that have been substantially affected by
violence and must coexist with the architects of such violence, reconciliation may be
more of a necessity than a choice. Those community members who have remained in
these areas despite the risks may well understand that their own political and economic
security depends to some degree on tolerating, if not reconciling with those who have
done them harm. For example, since the peace agreement was reached, in several
communities where the FARC had been demobilised and residing in reintegration
camps, local residents have asked that the FARC be allowed to remain in these camps.
Even though the FARC may have committed acts of violence against community
members, they recognised that they were better off reconciling with the FARC in their
midst than saying goodbye to them. They feared that if the FARC were to leave, those
who replace them may produce more violence and bloodshed.2 Therefore, I hypothesise
that because of more prosocial attitudes in Colombian municipalities that have lived
through much violence, and because of the expected benefits of peace the treaty
promised, we should expect that individuals in communities that experienced higher
levels of wartime violence will be more supportive of reconciliation (see also Garcı́a-
Sánchez, 2016; Steele, 2017; Weintraub et al., 2015).
Hypothesis 1: Individual experience with violence during the Colombian conflict
will lead to diverse reactions that will not produce consistent preferences regarding
reconciliation with the FARC guerillas.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals from municipalities in Colombia that experienced
greater levels of violence will be more likely to express favourable attitudes
regarding reconciliation with the FARC guerillas.
I utilise three measures for personal exposure to violence and one measure of con-
textual violence. First, I utilise a question in the LAPOP survey that asks whether the
individual has registered as a victim of violence in Colombia. This provides a measure of
personal exposure to violence throughout the history of the conflict. I note, however, that
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we would expect there to be some undercounting in the data as some individuals may not
wish to declare their status as a victim. As well, it is possible that there may be other
individual or institutional errors in the recording and recollecting of this status. The
second measure is derived from the LAPOP variable that asks survey respondents
whether any family members had their human rights violated in the last twelve months.
Third, I measure whether a member of the respondent’s family was lost to the conflict
from the LAPOP data. By using different types of indicators, we can better understand
how the complex, individual-level effects influence beliefs in the prospects for reconci-
liation.3 Finally, I create a measure of the overall level of conflict violence in the
municipality in which the survey respondent resides using data from the Colombian
government’s victim registry. I count the total number of incidents per capita in each
municipality for the preceding three years before the 2016 survey.4
The variable I use to measure attitudes regarding reconciliation is from the LAPOP
survey data for Colombia for 2016 – colpaz6a – which asks respondents, “Do you think it
is possible for citizens to forgive and reconcile with demobilised members of – The
FARC?” Of the 1,504 respondents, 51.6 per cent (777) said “yes,” while 48.3 per cent
(727) indicated they did not think it was possible. The Colombian population could
scarcely be more evenly split – a division that was reflected in the 2016 plebiscite that
was just narrowly defeated. I discuss below those additional factors that I expect will
affect attitudes regarding reconciliation with FARC.
It is important to note some critical issues regarding this measure. First, the question
asks individuals if they think that “citizens” can forgive and reconcile with the FARC.
Hence, it does not directly inquire about their personal attitudes, although one might
infer that there will be a rough equivalence among the two attitudes. Second, it speaks of
the “demobilised” FARC members in particular and not necessarily the membership of
the organisation as a whole, some of whom have not demobilised. As well, we cannot be
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Figure 1. Percentage of group that experienced various levels of violence.
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might affect their interpretation of the question. Some may have in mind a thick or thin
view of reconciliation that demands more or less of the individual and the FARC.
Despite these qualifications, however, I would still contend that this is a reasonable
measure of attitudes on a critical subject that is worthy of serious scholarly consider-
ation, even if it is not a perfectly designed vehicle for understanding such attitudes.5
Before proceeding, it is also important to understand just whom the violence in
Colombia is affecting and whether there are any differences among groups as violence is
experienced. In order to do so, I ran several tables to generate the percentages of each
group that experienced low, medium, and high levels of violence (divided at the 33rd and
66th percentiles) in Figure 1. For example, the reader will see that within the sample of
women in the LAPOP study (777 females), 38 per cent lived in areas that experienced
low levels of violence; 35 per cent in areas of medium levels of violence; and 27 per cent
lived in areas with high levels of violence. Indeed, we see that the percentages of men
and the percentages of women in the LAPOP sample who experienced low, medium, and
high levels of violence are remarkably similar. However, we can clearly see an urban/
rural divide among the survey sample. Greater percentages of rural people live in areas of
medium and high levels of violence – nearly 80 per cent reside in these areas. The urban
population is concentrated more in areas with less violence – only 56 per cent live in
areas that saw medium and high levels of violence. We see the most pronounced dif-
ferences when we look at ethnicity. While nearly 50 per cent of the whites in the sample
reside in areas with the least amount of violence and only 19 per cent reside in areas with
high levels of violence, the relationship is flipped for the indigenous and the Afro-
Colombian groups in the sample. Roughly 47%–48% of both groups live in commu-
nities that experienced high levels of violence. Only 8 per cent of the indigenous
population surveyed in the LAPOP study live in areas of low violence. We see here the
stark differences in the way people experienced the violence in Colombia, which also
tends to mirror the breakdown in support for the peace referendum. Those living in the
most violent areas were most in favour of peace.
The Key Conflict Issues
Negotiations to reach a peace agreement and the contours of such settlements often
highlight political divisions in a society that may make public acceptance and successful
implementation contentious. Research has shown that support for the peace treaty with
the FARC was strongly influenced by partisan ties (Demeritt et al., 2019; Dávalos et al.,
2018). Therefore, I include several variables designed to tap into individual’s support for
some of the principal objectives of the peace treaty: justice, government efforts to reduce
economic inequality, and attitudes regarding the treatment of coca, which played a major
role in the conflict. The first variable measures individuals’ support for increased pun-
ishment for criminal convictions. This question is not specific to the FARC or any other
armed group and should indicate individuals’ more general preferences towards getting
“tough on crime,” and thus it should not be directly related to individuals’ attitudes
regarding treatment of the FARC rebels. I expect that those individuals who believe
criminal penalties should be increased will be less likely to support the FARC peace
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agreement and be less willing to reconcile with them. Given that one of the principal
criticisms levelled against the peace treaty was that it was soft on guerillas who violated
international laws, those who are “tough on crime” may be more likely to oppose
reconciliation.
Second, I include a variable measuring the extent to which an individual believes the
government should take steps to reduce economic inequality in Colombia. It was the
poor, the campesinos and others in remote regions of Colombia the government had long
neglected who were the backbone of the FARC movement. Much of the fighting also
took place in these areas, which were also often critical turf in the drug cartel violence.
There seems to be general agreement that these long-neglected areas of Colombia are
home to some of the most egregious cases of unequal wealth distribution. As well, the
FARC claimed to be speaking for these long-suffering individuals and their needs
(Arjona, 2016; Daly, 2016). I suggest that individuals who believe the government
should do more to reduce economic inequality will be more favourably disposed towards
reconciliation, as that is one of the principal, overall goals of the agreement.
Finally, it is important to consider individual opinions on the coca plant and the
cocaine that is made from it. Cocaine production and transportation have exercised an
outsize role not only in Colombia’s economy but also its politics. Fortunes have been
made, politicians have risen and fallen because of these ties, and it has helped produce a
substantial degree of corruption in the government. The coca plant, however, has also
played an important role in many of the indigenous communities that suffered much of
the drug and political violence in the last forty years. While the indigenous communities,
as well as other sectors of the Colombian population, have advocated for less intrusive
and violent measures to address cocaine trafficking (e.g. preferring crop substitution
programmes over aerial eradication), the Colombian government (especially under its
more conservative presidents Uribe and Duque) has often pursued more violent measures
to disrupt the cocaine trade.6 Thus, there exists a critical difference of opinion in
Colombian society. On the one hand, there are those who accept some legitimate uses of
coca/cocaine (as the peace treaty envisions), as well as crop substitution programmes for
marginalised indigenous communities and other poor farmers to address the compelling
economic rationales for growing this crop. There are also powerful forces in society that
believe drug production should be addressed using more aggressive measures (aerial
fumigation, more severe criminal penalties). We might expect that individuals who are
willing to accept the circumscribed use of coca by these communities or the medical/
scientific communities, as an important part of the Colombian peace treaty, would also
be in favour of another key aspirational goal of the treaty – reconciliation. Therefore, I
suggest that those who perceive legitimate scientific or medical reasons for the continued
production of coca will be more likely to support reconciliation, while those who find no
such value will be more likely to be hostile to those involved in its production.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who favour increasing penalties for criminal convic-
tions will be less likely to express favourable attitudes regarding reconciliation
with the FARC guerillas.
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Hypothesis 4: Individuals who favour government policies to reduce economic
inequality will be more likely to express favourable attitudes regarding reconcilia-
tion with the FARC guerillas.
Hypothesis 5: Individuals who believe there are legitimate medical or scientific
reasons for the production of coca will be more likely to express favourable
attitudes regarding reconciliation with the FARC guerillas.7
Control Variables
I also include several other measures to capture the influence of socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics that might be related to favourable attitudes towards
reconciliation. These include measures of age, gender, years of education, religiosity,
and the respondent’s perception of the current, economic situation in Colombia.8 I do not
provide a specific prediction for these variables as there are no theoretically based
expectations regarding their impact or the results have been mixed.9
Analysis
I begin by using a simple probit model to evaluate the hypotheses (Table 1). Subse-
quently, I use a multilevel probit model to account for the potential effects of the
departments (i.e. provinces) and municipalities in which violence occurs. The fit of the
first probit model, as measured by the percentage of cases correctly predicted (63 per
cent) and the proportionate reduction of error – 24.4 per cent (which tells us the
improvement of the model over predicted the modal category in each case) is fairly
modest.
The probit estimates provide confirmation of both hypotheses regarding the effects of
violence on individual attitudes regarding reconciliation. On the one hand, I find that the
coefficients for the variables measuring whether the survey respondent was registered as
a victim of the conflict; lost a family member to the conflict; or was in a family that
experienced a human rights violation recently are not statistically significant, which is in
keeping with hypothesis #1. More specifically, among those individuals who report
having lost a family member or relative to the conflict, 52.3 per cent believe reconci-
liation is possible, while 51.6 per cent of those who did not experience such a loss hold
similar beliefs. The lack of differentiation largely remains when we examine those
individuals who registered as victims of the Colombian conflict. Of those who did
register, 53.8 per cent believe reconciliation is possible, while the percentage drops just
slightly to 51.2 per cent for those who are not registered as victims. I had argued that
given the lack of consistent findings on this subject, as well as the recognition that
individual victim reaction to the prospects of reconciliation would be highly diverse, the
lack of a consistent impact was to be expected. On the other hand, the coefficient for the
variable measuring the level of violence against individuals due to the armed conflict
over the period 2013–2015 in the municipality is positive and statistically significant. Its
substantive impact, however, is not so large. The marginal impact coefficient indicates
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that for every one-unit increase in this measure, there is a 51 per cent increase in the
probability of favourable attitudes towards reconciliation. However, because this is a per
capitised measure and the values of the independent variable range from .0001 to
approximately 1, it would take a fairly sizeable increase in such violence to exercise any
meaningful impact on individual opinions. Yet, the community-level impact of violence
on attitudes does indicate a robust relationship. Communities that experienced more
violence may have a greater desire for the peace and prosperity associated with recon-
ciliation, as well as a recognition of the necessity of reconciliation given the realities of
power relationships in such violence-afflicted communities. Further, because of the
destruction, disruption, and violence Colombians living in these zones have experienced,
the response of the Colombian government to community needs will be critical in
ensuring peace, security and reconciliation.
The findings suggest that to the extent there might be clear and direct relationships
between personal and contextual violence and attitudes about reconciliation, the sub-
stantive effects are modest at best. We know that the thought processes by which the
effects of violence manifest themselves (e.g. do they lead to PTSD, health problems,
etc.?) in the development of opinions on reconciliation have largely remained a black
box. We have not yet identified in the research cited above what psychological factors
may mediate between the experience of violence and the development of attitudes
regarding reconciliation (e.g. one’s outlook on life, previous mental health struggles), or
what external factors may interpose in the development of attitudes (e.g. poverty,
community-level experience with violence). If we are to uncover any systematic patterns
regarding the effects of violence on reconciliation, it would seem to demand a more
in-depth psychological assessment.
We can, however, examine whether belief in the prospects for reconciliation among
those who have experienced a personal loss is mediated by whether they were living in a
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Figure 2. Effects of contextual violence and personal experience with violence on attitudes about
reconciliation.
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error Z score p Value
Marginal
impact
Lost family due to conflict 0.031 .087 0.360 .721 .012
Family human rights violated 0.003 .097 0.030 .972 .001
Respondent registered as victim 0.032 .125 0.260 .795 .012
Total violence per capita in municipality 1.293 .513 2.520 .012 .515
Believe punishments should be increased 0.020 .022 0.920 .359 .007
Believe government should reduce inequality 0.075 .020 3.660 .000 .029
Accept scientific/medical uses of coca 0.114 .017 6.690 .000 .045
Age 0.014 .003 5.240 .000 .005
Female 0.323 .070 4.610 .000 .128
Years education 0.003 .009 0.280 .781 .001
Religiosity 0.059 .042 1.390 .163 .023
Optimism regarding economic outlook 0.297 .056 5.320 .000 .118
Constant 1.670 .404 4.130 .000
Note: N ¼ 1,347. Percent correctly predicted ¼ 63%. Proportionate reduction in error ¼ 23.7%.
Table 2. Multilevel probit estimates of Colombians’ belief in the prospects for forgiveness
and reconciliation.
Variable Coefficient Standard error Z score p Value
Lost family due to conflict 0.025 .089 0.290 .775
Family human rights violated 0.014 .098 0.140 .890
Respondent registered as victim 0.040 .127 0.310 .754
Total violence per capita in municipality 1.251 .617 2.030 .043
Believe punishments should be increased 0.022 .022 1.000 .315
Believe government should reduce inequality 0.075 .021 3.620 .000
Accept scientific/medical uses of coca 0.115 .017 6.620 .000
Age 0.014 .003 5.330 .000
Female 0.329 .071 4.650 .000
Years education 0.003 .010 0.310 .760
Religiosity 0.053 .043 1.220 .223
Optimism regarding economic outlook 0.294 .057 5.190 .000
Constant 1.611 .412 3.910 .000
prov var 0.0076 .0178 0.0001 .7611
var(_cons)
prov > municipio 0.0267 .0240 0.0046 .1551
var(_cons)
LR test vs. probit model w2(2) ¼ 4.31 Prob > w2 ¼ 0.1159
Note: N ¼ 1,430.
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binary variable to distinguish individuals who lived in municipalities that were at the
75th percentile or higher on the contextual violence measure, and those who lived in less
violent communities to investigate whether there were any conditional affects of per-
sonal experience on attitudes towards reconciliation. I find that among those individuals
who lived in the most violent municipalities and who lost a family member, 56 per cent
believe reconciliation is possible, while 51 per cent of those Colombians living in these
communities, but who did not lose a family member report believing reconciliation is
possible. Among those who lived in less violent areas, 47 per cent of those who lost a
family member believe in reconciliation, while 52 per cent of those who live in less
violent areas and did not lose a family member believe in the prospects for reconcilia-
tion. Hence, those who both lost a family member and lived in violent areas are most
likely to express a more optimistic attitude about reconciliation. The percentages and
the differences across the categories are largely the same when we look at whether the
respondent’s family experienced any human rights violation recently, or whether the
respondent had registered as a victim. The most pronounced support for the possibility of
reconciliation, however, is found among those individuals who live in less violent areas,
but did register as victims – 58 per cent believe that reconciliation is possible.
What is clear from the probit analysis, however, is that other measures are important
and substantively meaningful in explaining reconciliation. We see the impact of politics
in the relationship between support for some of the underlying goals of the peace
agreement and attitudes regarding reconciliation. Those individuals who believe strongly
that the government should take steps to reduce economic inequality (a key provision of
the peace agreement envisions the government taking a number of steps to help
Table 3. Probit estimates of Colombians’ belief in the prospects for forgiveness
and reconciliation with support for peace measure.
Variable Coefficient
Standard
error Z score p Value
Marginal
impact
Lost family due to conflict 0.016 .092 0.170 .862 .006
Family human rights violated 0.023 .105 0.220 .828 .009
Respondent registered as victim 0.017 .135 0.130 .899 .006
Total violence per capita in municipality 0.853 .548 1.560 .119 .339
Believe punishments should be increased 0.005 .023 0.230 .815 .002
Believe government should reduce inequality 0.059 .022 2.760 .006 .023
Accept scientific/medical uses of coca 0.070 .018 3.810 .000 .027
Age 0.012 .003 4.250 .000 .005
Female 0.316 .074 4.250 .000 .125
Years education 0.013 .010 1.290 .198 .005
Religiosity 0.020 .045 0.440 .662 .007
Optimism regarding economic outlook 0.154 .059 2.600 .009 .061
Support for peace 0.263 .019 14.190 .000 .104
Constant 2.304 .440 5.240 .000
Note: N ¼ 1,404. Percent correctly predicted ¼ 72%. Proportionate reduction in error ¼ 42.3%.
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impoverished communities within conflict zones) are more likely to believe in the
likelihood of reconciliation. A one-unit increase in this variable (it ranges between “1”
and “7”) tends to increase the probability of favourable opinions regarding reconciliation
by 3 per cent. Similarly, individuals who are more likely to believe that there are sci-
entific/medical purposes for cultivating coca are more likely to believe in the prospects
of reconciliation (the variable ranges between “1” and “7”). The marginal impact of this
variable – 4.5 per cent – indicates that greater belief in this notion leads to more support
for reconciliation. However, the hypothesised relationship between those who believe in
general that the justice system should impose more severe penalties on those who violate
the law is not borne out, as the coefficient for this variable is statistically insignificant.
The effects of the control variables are especially interesting as there are very strong
relationships between gender and age and beliefs regarding reconciliation. First, we see
that older Colombians are much more inclined to believe in the prospects for reconci-
liation. Given that older respondents are more likely to have lived through previous
peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, we might have suspected that these individuals
would hold more sceptical attitudes regarding reconciliation. Instead, the marginal
impact coefficient demonstrates that every one-year increase in age is associated with a
0.5 percentage point in belief in the prospects for reconciliation. A ten-year increase
would thus be associated with a 5 per cent increase in the belief in reconciliation.
The gender effects are quite pronounced. Women are 12.8 per cent less likely to
support reconciliation. Previous research (James Meernik) has also found that females
are less likely to believe in or support reconciliation after armed conflict. Whether this is
because women are typically singled out for abusive treatment because of their gender
(sexual violence towards women has long been a weapon of war), or because women are
often the ones left to pick up the pieces of their families and communities after the
violence, I cannot say. This powerful finding would seem to call for a more in-depth
examination of gender differences regarding reconciliation to identify what might be
causing this significant difference of opinion. We would be most helped by more
intensive studies that probe individuals’ attitudes regarding which aspects of reconci-
liation are more or less critical for men and women, such as forgiveness and trust. At the
same time, individuals’ past and present experiences, such as previous encounters with
political violence, familial violence, and crime may also mediate their opinions on
reconciliation. Individuals’ present circumstances should also be incorporated in more
depth to determine the extent to which women have more social and economic chal-
lenges to navigate, especially for those who are internally displaced persons; whether
family ties mediate the effects of violence on reconciliation and so forth. This finding
calls for greater theoretical development to identify the nature of these gender differ-
ences and more intensive survey research to identify the relative importance of these
potential causal and mediating factors.
Finally, we see in the probit model that those individuals who have a more optimistic
outlook regarding Colombia’s economic prospects are more likely to also believe in the
prospects for reconciliation. The results suggest that perhaps such attitudes share a
correlational relationship as each may tap into individual’s overall outlook on life.
Nonetheless, we should not rule out the possibility that as individuals perceive the
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country has a more secure economic future, they feel more secure in the country’s social
future as well as economic scarcity becomes less of an issue.
In the next stage of the analysis, I utilise a multilevel probit model to provide an
alternative method of accounting for the contextual effects on attitudes towards recon-
ciliation (Table 2). Multilevel modelling can be used to estimate the impact of larger
units or groups in which individuals reside on their behaviour and opinions. For example,
a model of student learning might incorporate the impact of the classroom environment,
which resides within a particular school, which in turn exists in a particular school
system. Each context can influence various aspects of student learning, such as the
quality of individual instruction, school-wide curriculum plans, and the resources of the
school system. Multilevel modelling techniques have been used in a variety of studies of
individual attitudes (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Arzheimer, 2009; van der Meer et al.,
2009; Weldon, 2006).
The w2 statistic, which tests whether a multilevel modelling process is more appro-
priate than a standard probit model, however, is not statistically significant. I note too
that the statistical significance of the individual coefficients mostly remains from the
initial probit analyses. The results would suggest that there is not a statistically signif-
icant rationale for utilising a multilevel model in this case.
Finally, it is also important to determine the extent to which support for the peace
treaty overall affects support for reconciliation. I elected not to include this variable in
the initial analysis because while it is highly correlated with reconciliation, it is not clear
if one causes the other, or whether they both tap into a larger construct of support for the
peacebuilding efforts of the Santos government. Nonetheless, it is important to ascertain
how peace and reconciliation are related. Therefore, I reran the same model, but with the
inclusion of the variable, “colpropaz1b,” which asks the question, “The government of
president Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC have signed a peace agreement (Table 3).
To what extent do you support the peace agreement?” The fit of the model improves
dramatically as evidenced by the pseudo R2, which increases from .08 to approximately
.20. Not surprisingly, the coefficient for the peace support variable is statistically sig-
nificant and also exercises a major substantive impact on belief in the likelihood of
reconciliation. For every one unit increase in the scale of this variable (“1”–“7,” where
“1” is no support and “7” is “support a lot”), there is a 10 per cent increase in the
likelihood of the individual supporting reconciliation. The two variables are closely
related to one another, but we do not yet know whether this is a correlational or causal
relationship. While this research has given us a comprehensive understanding of what
factors reconciliation, we still have much work to do in order to better understand not
only the relationship between peace and reconciliation, but other relationships such as
the connection between violence personally experienced and experienced contextually,
and why women are markedly more distrustful of the prospects for reconciliation.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research has been to better elucidate those factors that lead indi-
viduals to be more likely to believe in the prospects of reconciliation with their former
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adversaries in Colombia. Previous research has evidenced mixed findings on one of the
most critical factors related to reconciliation – personal and contextual experience with
the violence that created the need for reconciliation (Bauer et al., 2016; Clark, 2009,
2011; Elcheroth and Spini, 2009; Gibson, 2004; Hall et al., 2018; Rettberg and Ugarriza,
2016; Staub, 2006). While some argue and find that personal experience can matter a
great deal and even spur individuals to engage in prosocial behaviours that would tend to
benefit reconciliation, others argue that such experiences may lead to a desire for
retribution or an unwillingness to forgive those who committed crimes. While I cannot
claim this article has answered such questions, the results do provide insight regarding
what may be happening in these cognitive processes and what further information we
need to reach more definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, there are several key findings
that can inform future research.
Those individuals who personally experienced violence were neither more nor less
likely to exhibit favourable beliefs regarding reconciliation. Contrarily, individuals from
communities that were more affected by violence were more likely to indicate they
believed the prospects for reconciliation with the FARC were positive. I had argued that
because of the expected benefits of peace and reconciliation, as well as the community-
level prosocial attitudes that are more likely to exist in these Colombian municipalities
harmed by years of violence, contextual violence would lead to pro-reconciliatory
beliefs. The challenges of advancing peace and reconciliation in these Colombian
municipalities are extraordinary as a result of the government’s long neglect of these
hinterlands in which many marginalised communities live, such as indigenous groups,
Afro Colombians, and campesinos. Given that the individuals who are residing in these
Colombian municipalities do support peace and reconciliation, there is fertile ground on
which to build. Whether the current and future Colombian governments are compelled to
address their challenges, however, is uncertain. Because there is currently support for the
aims of the peace agreement in these formerly violent areas, it would seem that the time
to act is sooner rather than later lest the same cycles of neglect, mobilisation, and vio-
lence, with which Colombia is all too familiar, recur.
While the findings bore out the hypotheses regarding violence, the results are also
suggestive of the need for researchers to learn more about individual attitude formation
and the manner in which these personal and contextual experiences are processed and
then affect subsequent attitudes. Such research would entail a more in-depth psycho-
logical assessment of mediating factors that affect both how people emotionally deal
with violence, and how the experiences and their attitudes towards the violence affect
beliefs about reconciliation. Interdisciplinary research bringing together psychologists
and political scientists (as well as anthropologists and sociologists) would be most
helpful in the development of such an instrument for use in former conflict zones.
The model more conclusively demonstrated that opinions regarding critical conflict
issues and demographic factors matter a great deal, such as those variables measuring
support for the objectives of the peace treaty. I argued that if an individual supported the
goals of the peace treaty, she would also be more likely to exhibit support for recon-
ciliation as one more component of the peace process. We saw that support for gov-
ernment efforts to reduce inequality and an individual’s opinion on possible legitimate
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uses of coca increase confidence in the potential for reconciliation. Thus, some degree of
sympathy or understanding of the ostensible goals of the FARC enhances one’s belief in
the likelihood of reconciliation.
Finally, I suggest that future research should investigate the components of recon-
ciliation in order to understand more deeply what this concept means to individuals. At
the risk of being repetitive, we know that reconciliation is a complex and dynamic
individual attitude as well as a process of social interaction. We do not know what
individuals are thinking when they are considering the question posed by LAPOP. The
next step in the development of our understanding of reconciliation must be to unpack
the social, political, and personal factors that define reconciliation to the individual. We
need to know whether individuals possess thick or thin demands of reconciliation;
whether such opinions change over time; whether there is a particular component of
reconciliation that is critical to the individual, such as the need to hear the perpetrator
seek forgiveness, or perhaps the fate of a loved one(s). Such psychological data can be
combined with the attitudinal and contextual data to develop a more holistic under-
standing of what reconciliation means to the individual, and what will determine whether
she believes in such possibilities. Colombia would be an excellent place to address such
questions.
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Notes
1. “Reward, Not Punishment.” CNN.com as found on 6 September 2012 at http://edition.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/europe/08/02/widows.reaction/index.html.
2. See https://colombiareports.com/colombia-wont-move-farc-reintegration-sites-after-protests-
of-both-locals-and-former-guerrillas/ as accessed on 17 September 2019.
3. For the individual-level data, I use the question, “Are you part of the national registry of victims
of armed conflict?” – collt5 in the LAPOP survey. I also use the Colvioldh question, which
asks, “In the last 12 months, have you or any member of your family, i.e. your parents, siblings,
children, spouse or partner, had any of the following rights violated: right to life, personal
integrity, personal safety, personal freedom or free movement? Finally, I use the question,
“Have you lost any family member or close relative as a consequence of the armed conflict in
this country? Or, do you have a missing family member because of the conflict?
4. For the contextual variable, I use data from the Registro Único de Vı́ctimas (http://rni.unidad
victimas.gov.co/). These data report specific, self-reported indicators of violence including:
land dispossession, terrorist attacks, sexual crimes, threats, forced disappearances, homicides,
displacements, anti-personnel mine incidents, loss of goods, kidnapping, torture, and recruit-
ment of child soldiers. I calculated the total number of all such incidents for each municipality
for the years 2013–2015 and divided by the population of the municipality.
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5. The dependent variable refers specifically to reconciliation with the FARC, while the exogen-
ous, violence variables refer to actions taken by various actors. Ideally, the personal and
contextual measures would refer to violence perpetrated by the FARC, but in the absence of
such data, these measures are the best available. In fact, the inclusion of these broader measures
of violence should make it more difficult to find support for these measures as they do not
pertain just to the FARC.
6. See https://colombiareports.com/colombia-insists-on-aerial-fumigation-of-coca-despite-court-
ruling/ for more details on current policy. Accessed 1 October 2019.
7. To measure individual preferences regarding punishment for convicted criminals, I use the
variable “aoj22new” in the LAPOP data set which asks respondents, “To reduce crime in a
country like ours, penalties for criminals need to increase. Do you agree or disagree with this
statement?” To measure support for reducing economic inequality, I use the LAPOP variable
“ros4,” which asks, “The [country] government should implement strong policies to reduce
income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with
this statement?” To measure attitudes regarding the medical/scientific value of coca, I use the
measure “colpact12,” which reads, “At the negotiating table in Havana, the government and the
FARC have reached several agreements. I would like to ask your opinion about some of them. It
was agreed to keep some coca crops under state supervision and for purely medicinal and
scientific purposes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?”
8. The variable female is coded “1” for women. Age in years and years of education are self-
explanatory. Religiosity is measured using the variable “q5b,” which asks, “Could you please
tell me how important is religion in your life?” The variable was recoded so that the response
“Very Important” was coded as a “4,” and the values for “Somewhat Important,” “Not Very
Important,” and “Not Important at All” were adjusted as well. The variable used for economic
evaluations is “Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, the
same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?,” and the possible responses are “better,” “same,”
or “worse.” These were also recoded so that “better” was the highest value.
9. While there are other pieces of information that would be useful to include in the model,
including beliefs about some of the key components about the peace agreement, such as
reparations for the victims, these questions on the LAPOP survey were administered to only
a very small number of individuals (in the case of the reparations questions, there were less than
200 respondents for this question), and so these measures were not utilised in the analysis.
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